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YOU BELONG WITH ME: 
RECORDING ARTISTS’ FIGHT FOR 
OWNERSHIP OF THEIR MASTERS 
Ann Herman* 
ABSTRACT—Copyright law, governed by the Copyright Act, is based 
on utilitarian theory, which balances artists’ interests in ownership of their 
creations with the public’s interest in accessing and enjoying such creations. 
Copyright law provides for rights for creators of sound recordings, which 
include master rights—the recording artist’s copyright in the recording. 
Taylor Swift has brought the concept of master rights into the forefront of 
pop culture. In June 2019, Swift’s masters—the original sound recordings of 
her songs—were sold, and she publicly aired her dissatisfaction with the sale, 
as well as with overall premise that artists do not have a complete right of 
ownership over their masters. In this Note, I analyze the rhetoric of Taylor 
Swift and other musicians and determine that many artists, based on their 
rhetoric in expressing their views of ownership rights under the current 
copyright regime, seem to favor a property rights model of copyright law, in 
which the creator of a work is entitled to ownership of it. Based on these 
observations, I suggest some solutions which propose changes to copyright 
law and state law, inspired by previous solutions posed by other scholars, 
that would place artists’ rights to ownership and control of their work at the 
forefront of the laws’ purpose. This, in turn, will spur creativity and create a 
copyright regime that is fairer to artists and listens to what they want. 
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I. CALL IT WHAT YOU WANT: 
THEORIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
The Constitution of the United States provides for the “promot[ion] [of] 
the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to 
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and 
discoveries.”1 This constitutional grant provides the basis of U.S. copyright 
law. U.S. copyright law is governed by the federal government under the 
Copyright Act.2 Copyright protection in the U.S. is largely premised on 
utilitarian theories of intellectual property, of which copyright law is a facet.3 
Utilitarian theories seek to balance the interests of authors, creators, and 
inventors with the interests of the public.4 Utilitarian theory recognizes the 
importance of incentivizing creation while also making such creation 
available for the public’s use and benefit. U.S. copyright law seeks to reach 
such a balance. 
Apart from the utilitarian theory, there are various other theories of 
intellectual property, such as property rights theory and personhood theory. 
Property rights theory is largely based upon the theories of John Locke.5 
Locke believed one should be able to ascertain ownership over the things she 
creates—the fruits of her labor. While this theory originally applied to 
physical property, it has been expanded to intellectual property. Thus, one 
who creates a work of art is entitled to the ownership of her creation, for it is 
her rightly owned property. 
Personhood theory is largely based on the theories of Immanuel Kant 
and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel.6 Personhood theory stresses the 
emotional and mental labor an artist or author puts into her work and the 
connection she has to the finished product.7 Thus, because a creation is 
inextricably linked to the creator, the creator deserves to maintain control 
 
 * Ann Herman, J.D. candidate 2021. I would like to dedicate this Note to my grandfather and 
journalist, Martin “Gene” Herman, who always inspired and encouraged me to write. He was one of my 
earliest editors and supporters, and I would not be where I am today without him. 
 1 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 2 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. 
 3 See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 623–
24 (Peter Can & Mark Tushnet eds., 2003). 
 4 See William W. Fisher, III, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 169 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). 
 5 See id. at 170. 
 6 See id. at 171. 
 7 See id. at 171–72; Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Intellectual Property, in A COMPANION TO 
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 660 (Robert Goodin et al. eds., 2007). 
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over it.8 Personhood theory, like property rights theory, recognizes and 
emphasizes the creator’s personal relation to the work as a result of her labor 
and perceives the creator’s rights as more important than the public interest. 
In this Note, I analyze the rhetoric of popular musicians, most notably 
Taylor Swift, regarding a musician’s right to own her master recordings. I 
then parse the rhetoric to ascertain what theories of intellectual property such 
rhetoric conjures and what rights such rhetoric implies to seek. I then 
suggest—inspired by a survey of proposals from legal scholars—how U.S. 
copyright law and state law can respond to these demands. 
II. THE STORY OF US: 
COPYRIGHT LAW AS RELATED TO MUSIC 
Copyright rights in music are split between musical compositions and 
sound recordings.9 A musical composition constitutes the written music and 
lyrics, or the “instructions” for playing the song.10 A sound recording is a 
recording of a performance of the musical composition.11 The songwriter or 
songwriters initially own the copyright in the composition.12 The performer 
or performers of a sound recording initially own the copyright in the sound 
recording.13 Often, owners of musical compositions contract with music 
publishing companies to license use of their music.14 Under the Copyright 
Act, the owner of the copyright of a musical composition has the exclusive 
rights of distribution, reproduction, public performance, public display, and 
the right to create derivative works.15 These exclusive rights are alienable, 
and any of them can be licensed to other parties.16 Copyright owners of sound 
recordings enjoy fewer rights than do copyright owners of musical 
compositions.17 
 
 8 See Fisher, supra note 4, at 172; Shiffrin, supra note 7, at 660. 
 9 JEANNE C. FROMER & CHRISTOPHER JON SPRIGMAN, COPYRIGHT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 
378 (2019). 
 10 Id. This does not mean that the music necessarily has to be written down. It is enough for an artist 
to record her song, and that would still constitute a composition. 
 11 Id.; Copyright Registration of Musical Compositions and Sound Recordings, U.S. COPYRIGHT 
OFF., https://www.copyright.gov/register/pa-sr.html [https://perma.cc/K4FB-AY6L]. 
 12 FROMER & SPRIGMAN, supra note 9, at 380. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. 
 15 Id.; 17 U.S.C. § 106. 
 16 FROMER & SPRIGMAN, supra note 9, at 380. 
 17 Id. 
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The original sound recording is the master recording, and the copyright 
rights of the recording artist are the master rights, or the masters.18 The master 
recording is the recording “from which all later copies are made.”19 
Ownership of the master rights provides for control over the use of the 
recording.20 Often, in exchange for the financial backing of a record label, 
musicians will assign their master rights to the label.21 The owner of the 
master rights has the ability to control the licensing of the recording down to 
who can use it, when one can use it, what purposes it can be used for, and 
the price of its use.22 Thus, musicians who do not own their masters may not 
be able to control how their music is used in movies, commercials, and other 
types of media;23 whether the music can be publicly performed; and how the 
music is released, such as through which services and platforms.24 
III. SPEAK NOW: 
TAYLOR SWIFT AND MUSICIAN RHETORIC  
In 2006, Taylor Swift signed her first major record deal with Big 
Machine Records.25 Like many young artists, this was a dream come true, 
and signing away her master rights seemed like a reasonable price to pay for 
the chance to release her own album.26 Now, fifteen years later, she has 
publicly aired her dismay over her inability to own her master recordings.27 
Taylor Swift is arguably one of the most powerful celebrities in the 
music industry.28 She is also publicly vocal about musicians’ rights 
 
 18 Amanda Prahl, Taylor Swift Is Still Fighting the Battle Over Her Masters, and Here’s Why It’s So 
Important, POPSUGAR (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.popsugar.com/entertainment/What-Does-Mean-
Own-Your-Masters-Music-46337890 [https://perma.cc/2WV8-KXWU]. 
 19 Elizabeth Vulaj, Singing a Different Tune: Taylor Swift & Other Artists’ Fight for Music 
Ownership, PRACTITIONER INSIGHTS COMMENTARIES, Aug. 28, 2020, 2020 PRINDBRF 0225. 
 20 Prahl, supra note 18. 
 21 Id. 
 22 Damon Brown, Jay-Z Became Hip-Hop’s First Billionaire By Doing 1 Simple Thing Well, INC. 
(June 4, 2019), https://www.inc.com/damon-brown/jay-z-is-now-hip-hops-first-billionaire-by-doing-1-
simple-thing-well.html [https://perma.cc/7J6H-8XFK]. 
 23 Id.; Vulaj, supra note 19. 
 24 Vulaj, supra note 19. 
 25 Andrew Flanagan & Anastasia Tsioulcas, Taylor Swift’s Former Label Big Machine is Sold, 
Rankling the Star, NPR (July 1, 2019, 12:01 PM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/01/737613627/taylor-
swifts-former-label-big-machine-is-sold-rankling-the-star [https://perma.cc/3B69-GQZ6]. 
 26 Why Owning Your Master Recordings Means Everything, AWAL (Sept. 19, 2018), 
https://www.awal.com/blog/maintaining-ownership-rights-as-an-artist [https://perma.cc/Z74Z-ARX6]; 
Taylor Swift (taylorswift), TUMBLR (June 30, 2019), https://taylorswift.tumblr.com/post /185958366550
/for-years-i-asked-pleaded-for-a-chance-to-own-my [https://perma.cc/7XGN-EG67]. 
 27 Swift, supra note 26. 
 28 At the American Music Awards on November 24, 2019, Swift was named the “Artist of the 
Decade.” She has won twenty-nine American Music Awards, the most of any artist. American Music 
Awards 2019: Taylor Swift Takes Artist of the Decade in Record-Breaking Haul, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 
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pertaining to compensation for and ownership of their music. In June 2019, 
Swift publicly expressed her dissatisfaction with the sale of her first six 
albums to Ithaca Holding Group.29 Swift’s underlying unhappiness with the 
sale was due to her desire to own her music and her failed effort at purchasing 
the master recordings of her first six albums.30 In her statement, Swift 
laments her inability to purchase her masters. Although she has a new deal 
with another record label—a deal that allows her to retain her master rights—
her statement alludes to feeling cheated by signing a contract at age fifteen 
that divested her of those rights.31 
Swift is not the only major artist that has publicly expressed the 
importance of owning her master recordings and shed light on the music 
industry’s de facto denial of such ownership rights. Prince publicly 
denounced his record label amidst issues regarding ownership of his masters 
in the early 1990s. Prince’s early grievances began with his unhappiness with 
the restrictions his label placed on him.32 Prince “wanted to put out an album 
whenever the urge struck him, and it could be a three-song album or a 70-
song album.”33 Prince firmly believed artists deserved the right to control and 
own their works. In an interview with Rolling Stone in 1996, the singer 
warned “[i]f you don’t own your masters, your masters own you.”34 As 
expressed by one of Prince’s attorneys, “[Prince] drew attention to the issue 
of artists controlling their own destiny.”35 
Rapper Jay-Z also understood the importance of owning his masters, 
and in his negotiations with the record label Def Jam in 2004, Jay-Z assigned 
his master rights to Def Jam with the condition that they would revert back 
 
25, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/culture/2019/nov/25/taylor-swift-wins-2019-ama-artist-of-the-
year [https://perma.cc/JJB6-NQVQ]. Swift has won eleven Grammys and at the time was the youngest 
artist to win Album of the Year at the Grammys; she won the award when she was twenty years old. 
Taylor Swift, RECORDING ACADEMY, https://www.grammy.com/grammys/artists/taylor-swift 
[https://perma.cc/BG7N-VAZD]. 
 29 Anne Steele, Scooter Braun Makes $300 Million Deal for Big Machine Records, WALL ST. J. (June 
30, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/scooter-braun-makes-300-million-deal-for-big-machine-records
-11561893008 [https://perma.cc/6SX5-4DMQ]. 
 30 Id. 
 31 See Swift, supra note 26. 
 32 Melinda Newman, Inside Prince’s Career-Long Battle to Master His Artistic Destiny, BILLBOARD 
(Apr. 28, 2016), https://www.billboard.com/articles/news/cover-story/7348551/prince-battle-to-control-
career-artist-rights [https://perma.cc/98MT-EM6U]. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Rachel DeSantis, From the Beatles to Taylor Swift: Why It’s So Hard for Musicians to Own Their 
Music, PEOPLE (July 1, 2019, 5:23 PM), https://people.com/music/beatles-to-taylor-swift-why-its-hard-
musicians-own-their-music/ [https://perma.cc/5RTN-H5TK]. 
 35 Newman, supra note 32. 
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to him in ten years.36 Thus, while the ownership of one’s masters has 
incredible economic incentives, ownership also has personal significance 
because of the control it provides the owner. 
IV. HOAX: 
CURRYING THE WRONG INCENTIVES 
U.S. copyright law claims to operate under an “incentives-for-artists 
rationale,”37 under the premise that artists need incentives to create and that 
copyright law provides those incentives. However, this rationale does not 
align with the psychology of creativity nor does it reflect how copyright law 
actually operates. 
Professor Julie Cohen posits that copyright law, as it currently operates, 
is not so much about incentivizing creativity, but rather is about providing 
the framework though which copyrighted work can be exploited.38 For the 
law to actually incentivize creativity, it must focus on the artists and what 
drives them to create. 
The psychology of creativity shows that intrinsic motivation is more 
powerful than extrinsic motivation in spurring creative activity.39 Currently, 
copyright law primarily provides extrinsic motivation—economic 
incentives—for artists. However, artists create because “[t]ime spent and the 
burden of the everyday work [of creating] is a source of pride and worth, 
both as a matter of personal identity as well as professional merit.”40 An 
artist’s work is “intimately linked to their self-concept[,]”41 and, as a result, 
many artists have possessory interests in their work. Thus, fair copyright 
laws that would incentivize artists to create would recognize artists’ 
possessory interests and would allow them to retain as much control as 
possible over their work. 
 
 36 Zack O’Malley Greenburg, Jay-Z’s $50 Million Music Box, FORBES (Sept. 22, 2010, 6:18 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2010/09/22/jay-zs-50-million-music-box/
#19a14dc650de [https://perma.cc/QS8Z-UMN8]. 
 37 Julie E. Cohen, Copyright as Property in the Post-Industrial Economy: A Research Agenda, 2011 
WIS. L. REV. 141, 143. 
 38 Id. 
 39 Gregory N. Mandel, To Promote the Creative Process: Intellectual Property Law and the 
Psychology of Creativity, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1999, 2007–08 (2011). 
 40 Jessica Silbey, Harvesting Intellectual Property: Inspired Beginnings and “Work-Makes-Work,” 
Two Stages in the Creative Processes of Artists and Innovators, 86 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2091, 2122 
(2011). 
 41 Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1766 
(2012). 




The Importance of Control 
While economic rights are important, the ability to control one’s work 
may be just as—if not more—important to some artists. Control can also act 
as an incentive to creation.42 Ideally, artists want to control the use of their 
work by limiting who can use it, how others can use it, and when others can 
use it. On the other hand, artists may be interested in compensation for their 
work and will cede control in return for compensation. Scholarship suggests 
artists are more concerned with reputational harm, attribution, and 
misattribution than they are with economic rights.43 
As expressed by musicians’ rhetoric regarding ownership of masters, 
control may be more important or more desirable than compensation due to 
the personality and identity-representative aspects of their work. Further, 
some artists simply believe they should have control over their works “for 
having labored on them.”44 However, economic incentives and control are 
not mutually exclusive. One aspect of control that is so important is that it 
would allow an artist to decide how she wants to exploit her work. She would 
have the power to have complete autonomy over her work, or she would have 
the power to surrender some control in return for compensation. Control is 
important because it provides an artist with the power of choice. Thus, 
copyright law should address the importance of control and should not focus 
solely on economic incentives. 
B. Peace: 
The Importance of Fairness 
Research has shown that perceived workplace fairness can “lead to 
enhanced creativity.”45 Further, “[w]hen organization members perceive 
their environment to be fair, they voluntarily respond to higher levels of job 
demands by engaging more frequently in . . . creative behavior[.]”46 
Conversely, when working in environments that they perceive to be unfair, 
people are less likely to generate creative ideas and are likely to feel less 
motivated.47 This research has been extrapolated to the context of expressive 
creators, such as recording musicians, and argues the same principles of 
 
 42 See Stephanie Plamondon Bair, Rational Faith: The Utility of Fairness in Copyright, 97 B.U. L. 
REV. 1487, 1488 (2017). 
 43 Silbey, supra note 40, at 2120–21. 
 44 Fromer, supra note 41, at 1770. 
 45 Bair, supra note 42, at 1502. 
 46 Id. at 1503. 
 47 Id. 
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fairness and creative output apply.48 Thus, in order to incentivize creation, 
artists must feel they are being compensated fairly and are being treated 
fairly regarding their ownership and control of their work. 
In general, artists are likely to perceive a working environment or an 
agreement as fair if they feel that “their individual preferences, interests, and 
special needs are respected.”49 Having a voice in the decisions regarding their 
work and being given proper credit for their work also increases perceptions 
of fairness.50 
Providing artists with greater property rights, as well as moral rights, 
which will be discussed in Part VII of this Note, will likely cause artists to 
feel that they have greater control over their work and are being treated fairly. 
As a result, artists will be more likely to continue to create, and the utilitarian 
goals of U.S. copyright law will be furthered. 
V. TOLERATE IT: 
WHY WE SHOULD CARE ABOUT WHAT ARTISTS WANT 
Society, copyright intermediaries (such as record labels, music 
publishing companies, and streaming platforms), and lawmakers should care 
about what artists want. If the purpose of copyright law is to incentivize 
creation, then it matters what artists perceive as being fair. Having greater 
control over their works and being subject to laws that they deem as more 
fair will incentivize and spur artists to create. Artists are the backbone of the 
copyright regime. As there would be no need for copyright protection 
without artists, it only seems logical that such a regime should primarily 
recognize their rights. For it is “the producers and the writers and the artists 
[who] are the ones who are making music what it is[,]”51 not the public or 
intermediaries. While copyright law is artist-centered on its face, in reality, 
it is not.52 “Although the incentives-for-authors story [of copyright law] 
purports to celebrate authors, it has supported a system of property rights that 
 
 48 Id. at 1504. 
 49 Id. at 1511. 
 50 Id. at 1511–12. 
 51 Glenn Rowley, Taylor Swift Talks Changing Music Industry, Taking Control, BILLBOARD (Nov. 
5, 2019), https://www.billboard.com/articles/columns/pop/8542711/taylor-swift-talks-changing-music-
industry-taking-control [https://perma.cc/9EVV-V45G]. 
 52 See Cohen, supra note 37, at 144. Copyright law purports to incentivize creativity and create a 
system where an author is compensated for her work, so that she can devote the proper time and effort to 
it. Copyright law also focuses on protecting an artist’s work so that she is willing to disseminate her work 
to the public. Thus, on its face, the law seeks to protect artists. However, particularly in the music industry, 
music has become commercialized, and record labels and other music production companies have used 
the law to profit themselves. Often, due to access to more resources, these entities have greater bargaining 
power than the artist and can use the law to provide incentives to artists in a way that increases their own 
profits while taking rights away from the artist. Id. at 142–44. 
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as a practical matter relegates authors to the economic . . . margins of the 
intellectual property system.”53 Society and intermediaries are the 
beneficiaries of creative output, and it follows that they should have the 
burden of adapting to laws favoring artists. For, as society and intermediaries 
have learned to adapt to the current copyright regime, they would be able to 
adapt to a new, more artist-friendly regime. To achieve optimal 
incentivization of creation, as copyright law purports to do, artists must come 
first. 
VI. COME BACK . . . BE HERE: 
THE IMPLICATION OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 
Much of musicians’ rhetoric regarding ownership of masters is 
reminiscent of property rights theory—that the creator has property rights in 
the fruits of her labor. Property rights theory is more artist-friendly than 
utilitarian theory because, at a base level, property rights theory provides for 
the creator’s exclusive property ownership of her creation. This theory has 
been interpreted as a “value-added” theory.54 If the product of one’s labor 
provides value to society, then she deserves to be rewarded for her 
contribution.55 A reward may come in the form of control or ownership of 
her contribution. As artistic works have long been considered valuable to 
society, artists should be rewarded for the value they add to it.56 
Thus, if U.S. copyright law strictly adhered to property rights theory, 
musicians’ property rights would always be paramount to the public’s 
interest in access to musicians’ work because the musician deserves to have 
such rights due to her efforts or due to the positive public value of her 
creations. 
In her post about the sale of her masters in 2019, Swift emphasized the 
importance of owning her work.57 She stated “[y]ou deserve to own the art 
you make,”58 suggesting the importance of property rights for an artist, in 
line with property rights theories. In her acceptance speech for Artist of the 
Decade at the American Music Awards in November 2019, Swift described 
 
 53 Id. at 144. 
 54 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 305 (1988). 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. 
 57 Swift, supra note 26. 
 58 Id. 
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the award as celebrating “a decade of hard work and of art . . . ,”59 once again 
alluding to property rights theories. 
But why are these property rights so important? As explained in Part IV 
of this Note, a main reason is control. Ownership of one’s masters provides 
her with control over what others can do with her work. Many of the issues 
Prince had with his record label were about his lack of control. Because 
Prince had signed his master rights to his record label, he was unable to 
release music without the label’s approval.60 Prince once likened the control 
his label had over him to slavery.61 While this is an exaggeration, he clearly 
wanted to convey how confining and dehumanizing he felt his situation to 
be. In addition to requiring artists to assign their master rights to the record 
label, many recording contracts place creative restrictions on artists and lure 
them into long-term contracts that prevent them from making music. Typical 
recording contracts “require the exclusive personal services of the artist with 
respect to recording as a feature artist, for the duration of the contract” and 
are often “structured to require a minimal commitment on the part of the 
record label to actually record any albums, while reserving a considerable 
number of unilateral options to require additional albums.”62 This enables 
record labels to “renew and extend the term of the recording contract on the 
same terms that applied at the beginning of the deal,”63 which may be unfair 
and do not take into account an artist’s increasing popularity and bargaining 
power. 
Depending on the artists’ popularity when entering into the contract, a 
recording contract may stipulate that the label will only release music that is 
“commercially satisfactory,” or music that it thinks will sell well.64 Thus, the 
record label may have the ability to block artists’ music that it does not like. 
Further, many recording contracts’ durations are “stated in terms of delivery, 
instead of specific time periods.”65 Thus, depending on how long it takes the 
artist to record the number of songs specified in the contract to the label’s 
liking, “a contract requiring delivery of five studio albums could easily span 
 
 59 Alyssa Bailey, Taylor Swift’s AMAs Artist of the Decade Speech Was All Love, No Drama, ELLE 
(Nov. 25, 2019), https://www.elle.com/culture/celebrities/a29847923/taylor-swift-amas-artist-of-the-
decade-speech-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/53T3-ZJKY]. 
 60 Newman, supra note 32. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Tuneen E. Chisolm, Whose Song Is That: Searching for Equity and Inspiration for Music Vocalists 
Under the Copyright Act, 19 YALE J.L. & TECH. 274, 308 (2017). 
 63 Id. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. For example, a recording contract may include language stipulating that the initial contract 
period and each renewal period end “six to nine months after the delivery of the last album required for 
that period, but no less than a specified minimum time period[.]” Id. (internal brackets omitted). 
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a period of more than seven years.”66 As a result, artists “could remain 
trapped in an unfavorable deal for years, despite success of early albums that 
would otherwise give the artist enough clout to negotiate a better deal.”67 
Rapper Lupe Fiasco expressed similar rhetoric to Prince when he 
claimed he was “a hostage” to his label because if he did not give his label 
what it wanted, “at the end of the day the album wasn’t coming out.”68 Singer 
Kelly Clarkson expressed dissatisfaction with her label because it pressured 
her to change her look and sound in ways she was unhappy with because it 
believed that would sell better.69 Further, the label would not let her create 
the music that she wanted to create and controlled the genre and the specific 
songs that Clarkson could release.70 Singer JoJo also had an issue with her 
label where it continuously delayed the release of her album. Because her 
contract stipulated that she could not record music outside of the recordings 
done with her label for the duration of the contract, she was unable to 
continue to create music simply because her label would not release the 
music she had created.71 Similarly, it took years for singer Sky Ferreira to 
create an album that her label approved of, and the label continually delayed 
the album’s release.72 Swift has also alluded to creative constraints while she 
was with her previous record label.73 
Rapper Iggy Azalea, who recently entered into a deal with a label to 
create a new album in which she retains the master rights, has also expressed 
disillusionment with the music industry norms.74 Azalea posted on Twitter in 
response to Swift’s statement regarding the sale of her masters. Azalea 
supported Swift’s call for musicians to be able to own their master rights. 
She alluded to her own issues with the industry and stated, “this is why I’m 
so happy to own my master [recordings] for this new album, they really do 
 
 66 Id. at 308–09. 
 67 Id. at 309. 
 68 Aylin Zafar, What It’s Like When a Label Won’t Release Your Album, BUZZFEED (May 12, 2013), 
https://www.buzzfeed.com/azafar/what-happens-when-your-favorite-artist-is-legally-unable-to 
[https://perma.cc/B97E-88FT]. 
 69 Brian Hiatt, Kelly Clarkson on ‘The Voice,’ New Album, Her Dramatic Clashes with Old Label, 
ROLLING STONE (Mar. 20, 2018, 12:50PM), https://www.rollingstone.com/music/music-features/kelly-
clarkson-on-the-voice-new-album-her-dramatic-clashes-with-old-label-203672/ [https://perma.cc/U32R
-DDUN]. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Zafar, supra note 68. 
 72 Id. 
 73 Rowley, supra note 51 (“In my previous situation, there were creative constraints, issues that we 
had over the years[.]”). 
 74 Iggy Azalea (@IGGYAZALEA), TWITTER (June 30, 2019, 4:30 PM), https://twitter.com/IGGY
AZALEA/status/1145444575521181696. 
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[people] crazy dirty on ownership of their intellectual property in the 
[business].”75 
Singer Ciara also entered a deal with a new label in which she retains 
the master rights and has expressed that “[b]eing able to own [her] masters 
has been really cool. . . . To have that freedom and flexibility is amazing.”76 
Ciara’s statements again express the importance of control for artists and the 
constraints that lack of control places on them. 
If copyright law adhered to a property rights model, artists would have 
greater control over their work and would not feel that their creative 
expression or freedom was stifled by the business strategies of record labels. 
As the law stands, the artists, who are encouraged and incentivized to create, 
are prevented from fully expressing themselves and creating due to the 
restrictions and demands of the labels that are meant to release the artists’ 
creations to the public. The current model neither incentivizes creation nor 
benefits the public interest if artists are unable to create what and as much as 
they want. 
VII. I’M ONLY ME WHEN I’M WITH YOU: 
THE IMPLICATION OF MORAL RIGHTS 
An artist’s ownership of her masters also reflects the personal ties she 
has to her work. Because art is expressive, many artists feel their work is 
more than just a completed piece, but that it is part of themselves and reflects 
who they are.77 Because artists have such intense ties to their work, 
ownership of the work is about more than monetary gains. It is about artistic 
autonomy and owning a piece of themselves.78 
Throughout her career, Swift has been open about the emotional 
connection she has to her work. In an op-ed she wrote for the Wall Street 
Journal in 2014, Swift alluded to the effort and emotional taxation of 
creating her music as an aspect of the music’s value.79 She stressed that 
“[m]usic is art, and art is important and rare.”80 In speaking about her desire 
to own her masters, Swift related the importance of ownership to her 
personal life and childhood dreams. When she realized she was unable to 
purchase her master recordings and that they would be sold, she “had to make 
 
 75 Id. 
 76 Vulaj, supra note 19. 
 77 See generally Fromer, supra note 41. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Taylor Swift, For Taylor Swift, the Future of Music is a Love Story, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2014, 
6:39 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/for-taylor-swift-the-future-of-music-is-a-love-story-140476321
9?ns=prod/accounts-wsj [https://perma.cc/XD5C-MLUD] (“In my opinion, the value of an album is, and 
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the excruciating choice to leave behind [her] past.”81 For Swift, her music is 
part of her, so giving up ownership felt like parting with a piece of herself. 
Musicians and other celebrities have publicly supported Swift’s cries 
for ownership, and their rhetoric furthers the notion that both musicians and 
non-musicians recognize an emotional connection between a musician and 
her work.82 In support of Swift’s plea for ownership, singer Halsey spoke of 
the emotional impact of Swift’s work and referred to Swift’s work as “the 
painstaking labor of [Swift’s] heart.”83 Recording artists have an undeniable 
connection to their work that should be recognized when considering 
ownership rights of these works. 
VIII. BEGIN AGAIN: 
SOLUTIONS 
Solutions that provide artists with greater control over their works can 
be accomplished by alterations to the Copyright Act and state laws that 
address both property rights and moral rights. 
A. Our Song: 
Addressing Property Rights 
Section 203 of the Copyright Act provides an author the right to 
terminate a grant of her rights thirty-five years after the execution of the 
grant.84 In order to exercise her termination rights, an author must provide 
advance notice to the current owner of the rights at least two years before the 
date on which she can begin to exercise her termination rights.85 An author’s 
termination rights are inalienable but must be exercised within five years of 
 
 81 Swift, supra note 26. 
 82 See generally Kathryn Lindsay, Everyone Who Is Wrapped up in the Taylor Swift-Scooter Braun 
Drama, REFINERY29 (July 1, 2019, 10:25 AM), https://www.refinery29.com/en-us/2019/07
/236691/taylor-scooter-big-machine-artists-celebrities-reactions [https://perma.cc/YFH3-HFXC]; Dan 
Clarendon, Celebrities Stand with Taylor Swift Amid Scooter Braun and Scott Borchetta AMAs 2019 
Drama, US WKLY. (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.usmagazine.com/celebrity-news/pictures/celebrities-
stand-with-taylor-swift-amid-amas-2019-drama-pics [https://perma.cc/E7DE-3GU3]. Singer Selena 
Gomez’s mother, Mandy Teefey, referred to Swift’s music as Swift’s “blood, sweat and tears, especially 
as a young woman who shared growing up in front of the world[.]” Mandy Teefey (@mandyteefey), 
INSTAGRAM (June 30, 2019), https://www.instagram.com/p/BzWVSJjhT7Y/. Model Martha Hunt also 
referred to Swift’s music as her “blood, sweat, + tears.” Martha Hunt (@MarthHunt), TWITTER (June 30, 
2019, 7:29 PM), https://twitter.com/MarthaHunt/status/1145489481652482048. 
 83 Halsey (@halsey), TWITTER (June 30, 2019, 3:53 PM), https://twitter.com/halsey/status
/1145435250295635968. Singer Halsey expressed: “[Swift’s music] made my teeth ache like cold water 
and my heart swell and my eyes leak[.]” Id.; see also Lindsay, supra note 82. 
 84 17 U.S.C. § 203. 
 85 Id. § 203(a)(4). 
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the end of the thirty-five-year period, or she loses her rights to terminate a 
grant of ownership.86 
1. It’s Nice to Have a Friend: 
Inalienable Ownership Rights 
A change to U.S. copyright law that would favor artists’ property rights 
would be to make copyright ownership rights inalienable. Under such a 
scheme, an author could license uses of her work; for example, she could 
license rights to a record label to produce and market her recordings, but she 
could not transfer her full ownership rights of those recordings. While this 
would be a radical departure from current practice in the music industry, the 
industry could adapt to such a change. Instead of it being customary for 
artists to transfer ownership rights to record labels, it would become 
customary for artists to retain the ownership rights and only license rights 
for particular uses, such as for production and marketing. 
Further, labels would continue to be able to commercially exploit an 
artist’s work even if she had an inalienable right of ownership. For, as 
reflected by some artists’ ability to retain ownership rights while continuing 
to work with labels, labels still stand to profit from exploiting artists’ works.87 
As in Taylor Swift’s current situation, she likely would approve of 
inalienable ownership rights for artists, as expressed by her beliefs that artists 
“deserve to own the art [they] make.”88 However, amidst this belief, she has 
not ceased providing her music to the public or working with record labels. 
In November 2018, Universal Music Group announced its contract with 
Swift making it her “exclusive worldwide recorded music partner” and that 
the Universal Music Group-owned label, Republic Records, will serve as her 
record label.89 The agreement allows Swift to retain ownership rights in her 
masters.90 So, allowing artists to retain ownership rights can still be 
worthwhile for record labels. 
2. Long Live: 
Decreasing the Termination Period and Making it Perpetual 
According to the legislative history of the Copyright Act, Congress 
included a termination provision in recognition of the unequal bargaining 
 
 86 Id. § 203(a)(3), (5). 
 87 Taylor Swift, Jay-Z, Rhianna, Iggy Azalea, Frank Ocean, Ciara, and other artists have struck 
agreements with record labels to continue to work with them and share profits while still retaining their 
ownership rights. See Vulaj, supra note 19. 
 88 Swift, supra note 26. 
 89 Jem Aswad & Chris Willman, Taylor Swift Signs Landmark New Deal with Universal Music 
Group, VARIETY (Nov. 19, 2018, 7:06 AM), https://variety.com/2018/music/news/taylor-swift-news-
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power of new artists in contrast to the entities with which they contract.91 
While the addition of a termination provision is favorable to artists, the 
provision does not do enough to protect an artist’s ownership rights and still 
pays too much heed to the interests of industry titans. In order to level the 
playing field, the termination period should be reduced, and the termination 
right should be perpetual. 
The logic behind providing an extended period before which an artist 
may exercise her termination rights is to enable record labels and other 
distribution agencies a chance to regain the economic capital they invested 
in promoting an artist.92 Because it is difficult to determine the success of an 
artist when a label signs them, the label takes a financial risk in doing so. 
Thus, if the artist becomes successful and a lucrative asset to the label, the 
thirty-five-year period from the grant of rights to when the artist can exercise 
her termination rights gives the record label plenty of time to profit or break 
even on its investment. 
Thirty-five years is more than enough time for a record label to make 
back any losses from the investment and to realize profits on the risky 
investment that is signing an artist.93 Providing record labels with thirty-five 
years to economically exploit the artist’s work is a significant portion of the 
artist’s copyright term.94 Professor Jessica Litman has proposed decreasing 
the termination period from thirty-five years to fifteen years from the transfer 
of the original grant of ownership.95 Fifteen years, while considerably less 
time than thirty-five years, is still a sufficient amount of time “to make 
investment in copyrighted works worthwhile.”96 Professor Litman’s fifteen-
year proposal is appropriate, but not with the five-year notice period. If the 
termination period is to be fifteen years, the notice period should be reduced 
or eliminated altogether, as explained in more detail in Section VIII(A)(3) of 
this Note. With the current notice provisions, artists should be able to 
 
 91 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 124 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5740 (“[Section 
203] is needed because of the unequal bargaining position of authors, resulting in part from the 
impossibility of determining a work’s value until it has been exploited. Section 203 reflects a practical 
compromise . . . .”). 
 92 Amy Gilbert, Note, The Time Has Come: A Proposed Revision to 17 U.S.C. § 203, 66 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 807, 816–17 (2016). 
 93 See generally Jessica Litman, Real Copyright Reform, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1, 48 (2010). 
 94 17 U.S.C. §§ 302–03. A typical copyright term for an author, when the work is not a work made 
for hire, is the life of the author plus seventy years. The term is the same for joint works, but the measuring 
life is the life of the longest-living author. 
 95 Litman, supra note 93, at 48. Professor Litman also proposes increasing the minimum amount of 
notice to five years in combination with the decreased termination period. Id. 
 96 Id. 
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exercise their termination rights ten—to a maximum of fifteen—years from 
the original grant of ownership. 
Record labels are sophisticated parties aware of the termination rights 
provided in the Copyright Act. Ten years provides labels plenty of time to 
determine the profitability of an artist and to make back money invested in 
them. Limiting the termination period provides artists with a greater sense of 
control over their work by providing them with the chance to reclaim their 
ownership rights in a foreseeable amount of time. 
Additionally, the termination right should be perpetual. An artist should 
be able to determine when they want to exercise their termination rights, and 
if that is over forty years, that should be their prerogative. Doing away with 
the five-year limitation to exercise termination rights does nothing to harm a 
record label’s planning for the termination and gives the artist the deserved 
autonomy over her ownership rights and actions. 
3. I Knew You Were Trouble: 
Eliminating the Notice Provision of 17 U.S.C. § 203 
The notice provision is meant to provide the current holder of the to-be-
terminated copyright rights time to plan for the loss of those rights when the 
author terminates them.97 While it makes sense that the current holder should 
receive notice of termination, anyone involved in the music industry, 
particularly record labels, would be familiar with the termination right and 
would understand the possibility that an artist may seek to exercise that right 
thirty-five years from the grant. Such an extensive notice period actually 
gives the current holder time to devalue the copyright.98 For example, prior 
to the termination date, as communicated in the notice, the current holder 
could make the copyrighted work widely available at reduced prices in the 
hopes of increasing demand for the work, so that once the rights revert to the 
original owner, the value of the copyrighted work is significantly 
diminished.99 This way, the current rights holder can attempt to make as 
much money from the work as they can while they still own it, so that once 
the work reverts back to the original owner, there is not much value in it, and 
thus the current holder is not losing much in losing ownership. While there 
is no guarantee that a current holder would take such unscrupulous action, 
the risk to the original owner remains. Because the amount of notice required 
appears to be arbitrary, and current holders are likely aware of the 
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termination provision and had thirty-five years to plan for such termination, 
the amount of notice should be eliminated or at least drastically reduced.100 
No notice is a plausible solution because of the current owner’s 
knowledge of when an artist may exercise her termination rights. The current 
owner can take affirmative steps and discuss with the artist whether she plans 
to exercise her termination rights. Alternatively, a reduction in the notice 
period would still provide warning to the current owner—which is likely the 
reasoning behind the provision—and prompt them to plan for the ultimate 
termination. Additionally, a reduced or eliminated notice period would 
protect artists from unscrupulous actors by preventing them from having 
time to devalue the artist’s work. Eliminating the notice period would also 
protect artists who may not have competent legal support who would inform 
them of the notice requirement or who are unaware of the intricacies of the 
Copyright Act. These artists would lose their ability to re-gain their 
ownership rights simply because they did not have the proper information. 
4. I Forgot That You Existed: 
The Role of State Law in Protecting Master Rights 
In addition to changes in the Copyright Act, artists’ ownership of their 
master rights can be achieved through state law. Artists are often divested of 
their master rights through contracts with record labels. In addition to, or in 
lieu of, changing the Copyright Act, states can pass their own laws regarding 
what can and cannot be written into contracts and how recording artists are 
categorized with regards to works made for hire as applied to copyright 
ownership of master recordings.101 However, without any changes to the 
Copyright Act, these laws cannot conflict with the Act because, as a federal 
law, it would preempt any conflicting state law.102 Such laws should focus on 
artists’ ownership rights and should strive to preserve artists’ ownership over 
master recordings. Such laws should also seek fairness in recording contracts 
so that artists with little bargaining power are not induced to agree to unfair 
deals that hold them hostage to their label. 
 
 100 Id. at 845–46. 
 101 States may impose statutory restrictions on contracts “so long as their laws do not run afoul of 
some specific federal constitutional prohibition.” David E. Bernstein, Freedom of Contract (GMU Law 
& Econ. Research Paper Series No. 08-51, 2008), https://www.law.gmu.edu/assets/files/publications
/working_papers/08-51%20Freedom%20of%20Contract.pdf [https://perma.cc/UMB6-TRM7] (quoting 
Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730–31 (1963)). 
 102 Preemption, LEGAL INFO. INST., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/preemption [https://perma.cc
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a. Epiphany: 
Clarify When a Sound Recording is a Work Made for Hire 
One solution is tackling the work made for hire problem. Under the 
Copyright Act, a work can be categorized as a “work made for hire.”103 This 
means that the author of the work created it in the course of her employment 
or was hired for the purpose of making the work and thus is not the legal 
“author” of the work—her employer is. The Act defines a work made for 
hire as “a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her 
employment; or a work specially ordered or commissioned . . . ” for use in 
specific copyrightable works listed in the statute.104 Currently, sound 
recordings are not listed as a type of work that may be “specially ordered or 
commissioned” as a work made for hire, and it is unclear whether or not they 
may be considered works made for hire.105 If they may be, this would prevent 
the original copyright owner from exercising her § 203 termination rights, as 
those rights do not apply to works made for hire.106 To address this problem, 
state law could prohibit record labels from declaring that master recordings 
are works made for hire when the recording artist is not an employee of the 
label. Alternatively, as done in California, state law could delineate specific 
factors that must be shown in order for a recording artist to qualify as an 
employee, so that it is clear-cut when a recording artist enters into an 
agreement whether they will be considered an employee or an independent 
contractor. 
In 1999, Congress passed an amendment to the Copyright Act that 
included sound recordings in the list of works that could be specially ordered 
or commissioned as a work made for hire.107 However, the amendment was 
vehemently opposed by recording artists who successfully lobbied Congress 
to repeal it; thus, sound recordings are not included in the types of works that 
may be specially ordered or commissioned as works made for hire.108 If the 
amendment had remained in force, it would be significantly easier for sound 
recordings to be considered works made for hire, and thus it would be 
significantly easier for recording artists to lose their termination rights. 
Even with sound recordings being excluded from potential specially 
ordered or commissioned works, the work made for hire provision still 
threatens to divest artists of their termination rights. Often, recording 
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contracts state that while recording artists are not employees of the record 
label, their masters are works made for hire.109 Further, contracts frequently 
state that in the event that the masters are determined not to be works made 
for hire, the artist assigns the masters to the record label and grants the label 
a power of attorney to transfer the master rights to the label in the event the 
artist refuses to sign the transfer.110 Thus, even though a sound recording is 
not one of the enumerated works in the Copyright Act that can be specially 
ordered or commissioned as a work made for hire, record labels still attempt 
to contractually make sound recordings works made for hire in order to grant 
the label greater control over the work. While courts may deem such a 
contractual clause unenforceable, and while the few cases regarding 
termination rights have been resolved in favor of the artist,111 this does 
nothing to prevent record labels from fighting an artist attempting to exercise 
her termination rights. And, as the more powerful party in many situations, 
the record label likely has greater resources to fight a lengthy suit and may 
willing to do so in order to prevent an artist from exercising her termination 
rights and losing its control over a lucrative asset—the artist’s works. 
If sound recordings were deemed to be works made for hire, recording 
artists’ property rights in their work and the control they can exert over their 
work would be significantly limited. Particularly relating to recording artists 
who already do not possess control over their works in the form of ownership 
of the underlying musical composition, the inability to utilize the termination 
provision would provide them with almost no rights in their work, which is 
starkly against the creation incentives of utilitarian theory. To remedy this 
problem, state laws could prohibit record labels from stipulating in recording 
contracts that the recording artist is not an employee of the record label, but 
the works are works made for hire nonetheless. The law would require that 
either the artist must be considered an employee of the record label under the 
contract (and be paid a salary and benefits accordingly), and thus works 
would be deemed works made for hire; or the contract must provide that the 
artist is not an employee of the record label, and thus any master recording 
she makes would not be owned by the record label and would not be a work 
made for hire. 
Alternatively, state law can strengthen protections for recording artists 
as independent contractors. California has recently addressed the work made 
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for hire problem in an amendment to its labor code.112 Under the amendment, 
recording artists are subject to stricter standards when a court determines 
whether the artist is an employee or an independent contractor.113 This 
classification has important implications for the artist’s work. If the artist is 
determined an employee, the artist’s work is a work made for hire and her 
ownership rights are divested. If the artist is an independent contractor, her 
work is her own creation and her ownership rights are preserved. This new 
law—subjecting recording artists to a stricter legal test—makes it more 
difficult to prove that a recording artist is an employee, as opposed to an 
independent contractor. Thus, it is less likely that a recording artist’s work 
will be considered a work made for hire when that was not the intention of 
the parties. Therefore, state laws could also use this model of protecting 
recording artists from crooked works-made-for-hire claims by record labels. 
Changes to state law would not dramatically alter the copyright 
landscape and are in line with European countries.114 These changes would 
simply prevent record labels from claiming exclusive ownership of sound 
recording rights under a work-made-for-hire claim and would allow 
recording artists to retain their termination rights. However, such laws would 
still provide for works made for hire in appropriate situations. Additionally, 
these changes would decrease frivolous lawsuits by record labels attempting 
to deprive artists of their termination rights by claiming recordings as works 
made for hire or would make it much clearer when a recording artist’s work 
is a work made for hire and when it is not. Further, state laws of this nature 
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would not be preempted by the Copyright Act, as sound recordings are not 
specifically listed as works that can be specially ordered or commissioned as 
works made for hire. 
b. We Are Never Ever Getting Back Together: 
Limiting the Duration of Recording Contracts 
Additionally, state laws should limit the duration of recording contracts. 
As explained previously, typical recording contracts are “stated in terms of 
delivery, instead of specific time periods.”115 In order to prevent the situation 
in which an artist is stuck in a contract with a record label, state laws should 
limit how long recording contracts can last. This would provide the artist 
with an exit opportunity from an undesirable or limiting contract and enable 
her to seek to negotiate a new contract with the same or a different label. 
Under California law, personal service contracts may not last for a 
duration of more than seven years.116 However, the law provides an exception 
for contracts rendering “personal service in the production of phonorecords 
in which sounds are first fixed”117—or for contracts regarding master 
recordings. Thus, for recording contracts, in order to get out of a contract of 
a duration of more than seven years, the artist must give written notice to the 
record label “specifying that the [artist] from and after a future date certain 
specified in the notice will no longer render service under the contract.”118 
Further, the record label would then have the “right to recover damages for 
a breach of the contract during its term”119 and “for each phonorecord as to 
which that party has failed to render service.”120 Thus, California law does 
not easily allow a recording artist to get out of a recording contract in a time 
period less than seven years. California law should allow recording artists to 
have the rights of other personal service contractors without the limitations 
of a notice requirement. The law should also prevent a label from being able 
to sue the artist for damages as to every unproduced phonorecord, and other 
states should follow suit. 
State law should place a time-limit—not based upon output—on 
recording contracts, after which the recording artist is free to get out of the 
contract. Recording contracts would then have to be tailored to end within 
that time limit and the artist must be able to end the contract after that limit 
without being sued for damages for breach of contract or for every 
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unproduced phonorecord. Such a law would prevent artists from being held 
in unfavorable contracts for an unknown and elongated duration. This would 
allow recording artists to seek labels that offer them better deals and would 
allow artists to leverage any increased bargaining power they may have 
amassed since initially signing a contract. Such a law would be fair to the 
artist and would spur creative activity by encouraging artists to seek 
agreements that allow them to create what they want and give them a sense 
of control over their creations. 
B. Wildest Dreams: 
Addressing Moral Rights 
Moral rights provide artists with noneconomic protection of their 
work.121 Traditional moral rights include the rights of attribution and 
integrity.122 
In 1990, Congress passed the Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA).123 The 
Act provides for moral rights for artists of “work[s] of visual art.”124 While 
moral rights are provided to artists in many European countries, they are 
generally not provided to artists in the U.S.125 VARA adds a limited set of 
moral rights to U.S. copyright law by providing creators of works of visual 
art with the rights of attribution and integrity. Specifically, artists have the 
right: (1) “to prevent the use of his or her name as the author of any work of 
visual art which he or she did not create;” and (2) “to prevent the use of his 
or her name as the author of the work . . . in the event of a distortion, 
mutilation, or other modification of the work which would be prejudicial to 
his or her honor or reputation[.]”126 VARA provides artists with control over 
certain uses of their work they find offensive or degrading to their reputation. 
VARA’s legislative history reveals that it was passed to recognize and 
emphasize the importance of art and artists. The legislative history notes, 
“[t]he arts are an integral element of our civilization; the arts are fundamental 
to our national character and are among the greatest of our national 
treasures.”127 
While VARA is an important step in incorporating moral rights into 
U.S. copyright law, VARA’s limited nature is firmly rooted in utilitarian 
 
 121 See Ilhyung Lee, Toward an American Moral Rights in Copyright, 58 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 795, 
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principles prevalent in the law. As expressed in the legislative history, 
“[b]ecause of its limited nature, [VARA] protects the legitimate interests of 
visual artists without inhibiting the rights of copyright owners and users, and 
without undue interference with the successful operation of the American 
copyright system.”128 In order to avoid excessive expansion of moral rights, 
VARA only provides protection for works of visual art, which is a narrow 
definition that does not include sound recordings.129 However, VARA should 
be expanded to specifically provide recording artists with moral rights 
related to their masters. The language in VARA’s legislative history 
acknowledges the importance of artists and the connection between an 
artist’s work and her reputation.130 However, there is no reason that an artists’ 
connection with her art should not extend beyond visual artists. 
The legislative history provides scraps of rationale for the exclusion of 
other types of artistic works, specifically audiovisual works. The legislative 
history harps on the differences between visual works and audiovisual 
works. Audiovisual works—unlike visual works—are usually works made 
for hire, and the creator of the work does not typically have economic rights 
in it.131 Further, normally many copies of audiovisual works are produced 
and distributed for commercial purposes.132 Because there are many copies 
of a single audiovisual work available, the destruction of one copy is not 
detrimental to the creator because the copy is replaceable.133 However, this 
logic focuses solely on the physical destruction of a work of art as opposed 
to the reputational alteration or mutilation of a work in the form of a 
derivative work or other undesirable uses. 
While a sound recording can be copied and distributed widely for 
commercial gain like an audiovisual work, sound recordings are often not 
considered works made for hire, and the creator retains economic rights in 
the recording, unless they assign them. The artist does not necessarily create 
the work with the knowledge that she will never own it. 
Additionally, recording artists, like visual artists, are inextricably linked 
to their work to the extent that “[a]ny distortion of such works is 
automatically a distortion of the artists’ reputation. . . .”134 Some scholars 
argue that recording artists are more connected to their work than are visual 
 
 128 Id. at 10. 
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artists because “a voice is as distinctive and personal as a face. The human 
voice is one of the most palpable ways identity is manifested” and “the singer 
manifests herself in the song.”135 From the perspective that VARA is meant 
to recognize the importance of art to an artists’ reputation, sound recordings 
are akin to works of visual art. 
Because works of visual art are different from sound recordings, the 
rights of VARA do not have to be expanded to sound recordings in a parallel 
fashion. VARA, as related to sound recordings, should provide the original 
recording artist the right to prevent the use of her recording for purposes she 
deems to be “prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation.”136 Like typical 
VARA rights, this right shall not be transferrable and shall last for the 
author’s lifetime,137 but the right should not be waivable. Thus, even if the 
original copyright owner in a sound recording no longer owns the copyright 
in her work, she still retains control over her work in that she can object to 
uses of her work she finds harmful or offensive to her reputation, such as use 
of her song in an ad supporting the National Rifle Association when she is 
an anti-gun advocate. Also, a record label or other entity should not be able 
to attempt to take VARA rights away by providing waiver of such rights as 
a contractual provision. Such a simple expansion of VARA would provide 
recording artists with the important right of integrity. This would protect an 
artist’s reputation with regard to her works and would provide her with an 
important sense of control of property she deems as indistinguishable from 
her person and reputation. 
The right of integrity is provided for recording artists in the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty (WPPT). The U.S. is a signatory to the WPPT, but “[d]espite the 
commitments the United States made in joining WPPT, the treaty has had no 
effect on performers’ [(including recording artists’)] rights under domestic 
law.”138 Under U.S. law, such moral rights must be specifically contracted 
for in order for an artist to exercise them.139 Providing recording artists with 
such moral rights would simply bring the U.S. into compliance with its 
obligations under the WPPT. Further, some European countries, such as 
France and Germany, provide performers with moral rights.140 Thus, 
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providing these rights would also bring the U.S. into harmony with other 
countries. 
IX. LONG STORY SHORT: 
CONCLUSION 
Taylor Swift’s public desire to own her masters is both reasonable and 
understandable. She and all artists work hard to create their work and deserve 
to have ultimate control over it. Thus, increasing both property rights and 
moral rights for artists under U.S. copyright law and implementing state laws 
that protect artists’ property rights will reward the very people who create 
the valuable capital copyright law painstakingly attempts to protect and will 
incentivize them to create. Implementing changes to U.S. copyright law and 
state laws that provide greater control and are fairer to artists further the goals 
of copyright law. 
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